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Henry Wade Rogers, Dean of the Yale Law School and former president of Northwestern University, has accepted the presidency of the Congress.

The general committee for the promotion of the interests of the Congress is already large, and growing. Many of the foremost men of New England have accepted places on it. The list includes most of the United States Senators from the New England States, governors and ex-governors, presidents of universities and colleges, presidents of boards of trade, judges, clergymen, educators, etc.

The list of speakers is not yet complete, but we can give assurance that those who will address the Congress will be among the strongest men and women in the peace movement. Among them will be Hon. John W. Foster, ex-Secretary of State, Hon. Richard Bartholdt, President of the Interparliamentary Union Group in Congress, Judge Simeon E. Baldwin, former Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Bishop MacVicar, Justice David J. Brewer, Dr. James Brown Scott, Hon. Samuel W. McCall, Herbert Knox Smith, Mr. Samuel Gompers, etc. Others expected are Professor John Bassett Moore, Dean George W. Kirchwey, Dr. E. E. Brown, National Commissioner of Education, etc. There is more than an even chance that Baron d'Estournelles de Constant from Paris and Rev. Walter Walsh from Scotland will be present, as they are expected in this country at that time. It is hoped also that some of the diplomatic representatives of other nations at Washington will be able to get away from their official duties and attend the Congress, as they have been invited to do.

The afternoon and evening which will be spent at New Britain, twelve miles from Hartford, will be a most interesting feature of the Congress. This will probably take the form of an automobile pilgrimage to New Britain, with a reception and demonstration by the school children, a visit to the grave of Elihu Burritt, followed by a supper, and afterwards a mass meeting in the Opera House with speaking by prominent members of the Congress.

We shall hope to be able to publish in our April issue a fairly complete program of the proceedings.

It is important that the largest possible number of the friends of peace from all over New England should arrange to attend the sessions of the Congress. Arrangements have been made for reduced rates on the railways, on the certificate plan.

### The Anglo-German Deadlock.

There are some evidences that Great Britain and Germany are beginning to try better to understand each other, or, at any rate, that certain sections of the people and of the public men on both sides of the North Sea are beginning seriously to grapple with the situation. There does not seem, however, to be any appreciation in

either country, except among the pacifists, of the deadly mischief which the naval rivalry between them is producing, nor of the fact that there can be no thorough and lasting change of attitude so long as this rivalry goes forward.

Speaking at the dinner of the German colony in London on January 28, the Emperor's birthday, Count Metternich, the German Ambassador, gave utterance in a luminous way to certain elemental commercial truths, the understanding of which ought to convince every Englishman and every German that commercial jealousy and hostility between the two countries is worse than folly. He said, as reported in the British papers:

"With national unity accomplished there is for us no thought of further war in order to attain national aims. This is known to every one in Germany, and we here know it too. Nevertheless it is not superfluous that this truth, which to us Germans seems a matter of course, should be 'stated,' for there are people who assert that we are only awaiting the opportunity to fall upon any weaker power. To such hallucinations of timorous souls it is not easy to reply. The mind that can conceive them is not open to reasonable argument. Our conscience, however, is clear. We can point to the fact that Germany has kept the peace for nearly forty years, and for more than half that period under the rule of his majesty the Emperor. Could the same be said of all the other great powers? We have not succumbed to the temptation to use our might.

"Every nation, however, and more especially one which is developing rapidly, as Germany is, has aspirations which vary in the course of its evolution. We must depend to a large extent upon export trade, and in order to secure this trade we must seek commercial relations abroad and try to preserve those already made. This is the real meaning of that frequently misunderstood expression 'Weltpolitik.' Our policy of commerce is directed towards the peaceable acquisition of new markets. The weapons with which this policy of conquest is carried out are intellectual industry, skill and knowledge.

"As a matter of fact, no markets can be gained by brute force. You cannot compel any one to do business with you at the point of a bayonet if he has neither inclination nor money to do so. Doing business, selling or exchanging goods, presupposes willingness in both parties. This refers equally to the home as to the foreign market. The political boundaries have lost much of their significance through the increase of the facilities of trading. No civilized country can nowadays shut itself off from the rest of the world without injury to itself. The policy of peaceful conquest of trade has the advantage that it does not act in a spirit of exclusion. I have never believed that among the commercial and industrial nations in their modern conception the destruction of one of two rivals could mean advantage to the other. Let us suppose that one of two such rivals should succeed in suppressing the commerce and industry of the other. What would be the result? Simply that the victor would no longer be able to sell anything to the vanquished, and thus he himself would have destroyed a good customer.

"Commercial rivalry is not to be conceived as if international trading could be represented by a trader sitting

on a block of gold, from which he is continually detaching pieces with which to pay for the goods others are pressing upon him. On the contrary, there is no constantly diminishing block of gold, but simply an exchange of products. Germany and England, for example, are doing this, and their exchange of commodities forms the basis of their commercial balance-sheet. The more the interchange of products increases, the more both countries are enriched. The possibility of a disturbance of these relations is nowhere regarded with greater apprehension than in the leading centres of industry and commerce. Hence it results that, notwithstanding the rivalry, those primarily interested demand the continued existence and not the annihilation of the rivalry. In view of the high development and great sensitiveness of the modern system of credit, the increased facility for investing capital abroad, and the extensive use which is made of this facility, it is impossible to conceive the idea of the forcible suppression of a commercial competitor without the aggressor injuring himself to an almost equal extent.

"We have repeatedly observed during the last few years that the great national and semi-national banks of France, England and Germany—not to overlook the banks of the United States—come to one another's aid in order to mitigate the financial crisis in one or other of these countries, although they themselves were suffering from a scarcity of money. No banking institution acts from motives of philanthropy, but only from well-considered self-interest. Thus self-interest induced them to assist a rival,—for all the countries named are commercial rivals,—in order that the duration of its economic decline might be as short as possible, and not accentuate itself still more, for they all of them felt themselves threatened and injured by the economic and financial distress of one of their number.

"If we follow this idea still further we shall arrive at the thesis, which to many may perhaps sound like a paradox, that it is not in injuring one another, but, on the contrary, in aiding one another, that lies the common interest of commercial rivals; for commerce, finance and industry in their modern state of advancement have broken down political boundaries, and are so interwoven internationally as to be dependent upon one another. In saying all this I do not imagine that I am telling you anything new, who to a large extent are yourselves taking an active part in international trade. But in view of the strange opinions which are nowadays disseminated on the subject of international competition, it can do no harm to refresh the memory of those who appear to have forgotten the very A B C of the international economic code.

"And if our development impels us to move out into the wide world and across the seas,—our future lies on the sea, according to the well-known saying of our Emperor,—in order to secure the freest possible expansion of the economic power of our nation, this is simply the outcome of our national aspirations and necessities. They threaten no one. We are building our fleet in accordance with the program which has been known for ten years, and which has been fixed by act of Parliament.

"In spite of the commercial reasons which impel us to wander far abroad, the pivot of our existence is in the Fatherland, which the army is called upon in the first

place to protect. It is therefore neither necessary for us nor have we any pretensions to be or to become the strongest on the sea. The ocean is free, and, according to the conception of all civilized nations, belongs to no single power alone. We do not wish to rule the seas, but we desire to occupy a position commanding respect commensurate with our commercial and colonial interests. But neither our fleet nor our army threatens any one so long as we are not threatened ourselves. And since we have no intention of competing for supremacy on the sea, is it reasonable to suppose that we seek to become involved in a naval quarrel whilst we know that we are much stronger on land?"

It is a pity that Count Metternich did not go a step further, under instructions from home, and, instead of setting up an apology for German naval expansion, frankly propose to the British government an agreement for limitation of naval armament. That would have been the logical conclusion of what he had been so truthfully saying about commerce. Instead of doing this, he turns his discourse deftly into an apology for the German navy scheme. This scheme had been fixed by act of Parliament in 1900, ten years ago. In doing this he declared, in substance, that it was suspicion and fear of England that was really behind the German naval program, for in the Preamble to the Navy Act of 1900 are these significant words, as pointed out by the *Manchester Guardian*:

"Under the existing circumstances, in order to protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, there is one means only, namely, Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest naval power, a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest sea power, because generally a great sea power would not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us. But even if it should succeed in confronting us in superior force, the enemy would be so considerably weakened in overcoming the resistance of a strong German fleet that, notwithstanding a victory gained, the enemy's supremacy would not at first be secured any longer by a sufficient fleet."

This of course meant England, and hence every English navy promoter, every advocate of the two-power standard and British naval supremacy, was quick to turn it into a telling argument for a bigger English navy. Count Metternich's great speech will therefore leave the situation just as it was before, because the German naval program has not been changed since 1900. Suspicion, fear and alarm, as in the past, will continue to rule between the two countries, until some responsible English statesman shall have the insight and the moral courage frankly to propose the abandonment of the two-power standard and an agreement with Germany and other powers for arrest and reduction of naval armament. Explanations will not explain, will not be accepted, so

long as superiority of brute force is the ideal standard by which governmental policies are determined.

The *Westminster Gazette*, in an able editorial severely condemning the use of the German scare for electioneering purposes during the recent election, advised Mr. Balfour and his followers to cultivate a *civil tongue* towards Germany. That was admirable counsel. But the same paper, in summing up the proper policy for Great Britain to be "the civil tongue and the supreme navy," practically neutralized the whole force of its advice. The supreme navy is exactly what has made Great Britain's tongue uncivil toward her powerful neighbor. It is also exactly what has made Germany suspicious and hence determined not to run any risk from the "mightiest naval power." It will continue to be so on both sides. So long as Great Britain persists in the effort to be supreme in brute force against any two powers on the sea, Germany will adhere to the principle of her program of 1900, and the insane, panic-making, economically ruinous rivalry will go on, to the shame and the peril of the world. There is but one way out.

### The Commercial Neutralization of Manchuria.

During the past month much criticism has been made of a proposition by Secretary Knox for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways. Few particulars have been known about it, and these are somewhat obscure; but Mr. Knox himself, in a short interview, has given an explanation and the *Outlook* for February 12 has ventured upon a statement of the facts, with some doubt as to their accuracy.

What is the question? To understand it one must go back to the results of the Russo-Japanese War, which are embodied in the Portsmouth treaty. Previous to that war Russia enjoyed a right by lease to the operation of a system of railroads running the entire width of Manchuria from west to east, connecting her Trans-Siberian railroad with her Asiatic seaport, Vladivostok. This road was intersected about midway at Harbin by the South Manchurian railroad to Dalny and Port Arthur, at which latter place Russia, after years of diplomatic negotiation, had obtained an ice-free port. As a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan secured Russia's rights, by transfer of lease, to the railroad there from a point a few miles south of Harbin to and including Port Arthur and Dalny. Japan had hastily built a road from Antung to Mukden for military use during the war. This line practically connected Japan with Mukden, as it joined her railroad which runs the whole length of Korea. The possession of this comprehensive railway system by Japan is of great commercial as well as military value to her.

The South Manchurian railroad is also connected with another system that goes to Peking and will ultimately connect Peking with South China. This latter line is operated by China.

Both Russia and Japan have the right to administer their railroad property and a small zone of territory on either side of it. Both are pledged by the Portsmouth treaty to guarantee equal commercial rights to all nations, and not to obstruct China's plans for the progress of commerce in Manchuria. Neither is expected to use its franchise in Manchuria for strategical purposes, but simply for commercial development. This restriction, however, does not apply to the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan acquired by transfer of the lease from Russia with China's consent. But Japan has always shown a readiness to pledge herself to respect the "open door" in China generally. This is shown by treaties or declarations made by her not only with Russia, but with France, England and the United States. Complaints, however, have been made of discrimination against American shippers in the form of secret rebates given by the Japanese railroad management in Manchuria to citizens of Japan. No tangible evidence of it has been published; but if a case of discrimination can be proved, there is no legal authority in the Orient from which redress can be obtained.

Under these circumstances, when China, the owner and ultimate sovereign of Manchuria, could afford no relief to American shippers in Manchuria, a proposition was made that a new railroad be built parallel with the South Manchurian railroad connecting Peking with a point on the Trans-Siberian railway west of Harbin and running through Mongolia, a part of the Chinese Empire which is under the undisputed control of China and is not leased. It was thought that such a railroad would in the first place secure the privileges of the "open door" which seem to be threatened, and at the same time would create a new field for the development of the resources of China. It would give her a shorter route to St. Petersburg and be of strategic advantage to her because the road would be entirely in Mongolia. Incidentally it would give to American and other foreign capital new opportunities for investment, of which they feel the need.

To this proposition Secretary Knox offered a substitute. He suggested that the leases under which Russia and Japan managed their railroads in Manchuria be bought up for China by an international syndicate of capitalists, several of whom stood ready to support him, and the roads be operated by China under sufficient international supervision to secure safety of investments. The combination was to include Japan, Russia, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. By the terms of the railroad leases in Manchuria made by treaty in Peking, the roads revert automatically to China eighty years from